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Abstract 
This study sheds light on the resiliency of competing electronic order-driven markets by investigating 
the time path of liquidity after a large endogenous shock by means of an intra-day event study. We con-
firm earlier results that large trades, which qualify as shocks for the purpose of this analysis, are timed 
as they occur when liquidity in the market is extraordinarily high. Moreover, we find that adverse li-
quidity effects peak within the first-minute interval after a large trade. In contrast to previous research-
ers’ results, we discover that liquidity recovers not within minutes, but within a few seconds so that the 
adverse effect already diminishes significantly towards the end of the first post-event minute. Three 
minutes later, basically no residue from the liquidity shock remains observable. We attribute this find-
ing to the fact that temporary order-book imbalances are immediately detected by algorithmic trading 
engines and high-frequency traders whose order management (IT-) systems are continuously eagle-
eying the stock markets for such opportunities. Interestingly, our results differ depending on the market 
under scrutiny. 
Keywords: Electronic Trading Systems, Resiliency, Market Quality. 
1. Introduction 
European securities markets are increasingly competing for investors’ order-flow. Competition between 
execution venues is important as it drives down trading costs; the lower the trading costs, the more at-
tractive is the market for investors. However, a competitive market requires by definition that there be 
more than one supplier in the market, and as such, competitive markets are always fragmented (Lee, 
2002). In securities markets, fragmentation arises when all orders do not interact with each other via a 
single execution mechanism but across a multitude of execution venues. 
This leads to two interesting questions: Firstly, what does “attractive” in this context refer to, i.e. when 
is a market attractive for traders? And secondly, what are the implications of fragmentation for the at-
tractiveness of an execution venue to traders? Before answering these questions, we shall have a brief 
look at the technological developments that continue to shape the securities industry: beginning in the 
late 1990s, the electronification of execution venues across Europe enabled market participants (banks, 
brokers as well as their institutional and retail clients) to remotely access electronic order-books (Gsell 
and Gomber, 2009). Since the first decade of this century, electronification goes much further: algo-
rithmic trading, defined in general as the use of computer algorithms to manage the trading process 
(Hendershott et al., 2011), is increasingly used to divide large trades into several smaller trades in order 
to minimize market impact.1 Hendershott et al. (2011) show that algorithmic trading may have a posi-
tive impact on market liquidity. 
Market liquidity is widely regarded to be the most important criterion for market quality (Clemons and 
Weber, 1992), giving investors the opportunity to buy and sell stocks immediately and without ad-
versely affecting the price (Gomber et al., 2004). Coming back to the question of attractiveness, we can 
state that the more liquid a market, the higher its attractiveness for traders and investors. Aside from the 
explicit costs (such as exchange fees, taxes etc.), overall execution costs are determined implicitly by a 
market’s liquidity (Davydoff et al., 2002); hence, the higher the liquidity in a certain stock, the lower 
the implicit trading costs for investors demanding immediacy (Irvine et al., 2000). In terms of quantify-
ing liquidity, pertinent literature unanimously suggests that liquidity cannot be captured by a single 
measure (Bernstein, 1987; Dong et al., 2007) and thus identifies four main dimensions of market quality 
(immediacy, width, depth, and resiliency), which have been researched extensively both theoretically 
and empirically (Garbade, 1982; Kyle, 1985; Harris, 1990). Yet, to the best knowledge of the authors, 
no academic studies have empirically assessed and compared the recovery of liquidity (resiliency) 
across electronic trading system-based execution venues – the most common organization of equities 
trading in Europe nowadays – in the context of newly arising competition between these execution ven-
ues.  
Referring to the second question above – the implications of fragmentation for the attractiveness of a 
market – a key issue is how (i.e. based on which information) investors choose among alternative mar-
kets. Although being an important decision criterion for investors facing this choice, resiliency seems to 
have been neglected in previous empirical academic research. Following the argumentation by Hitt and 
Brynjolfsson (1996) that “a firm with a unique access to IT may be in a position to earn higher profits 
from that access”, it might well be conceivable that a firm with such a unique access is one that employs 
IT in order to specifically exploit resiliency differentials between execution venues. 
In this paper, we study the time path of a specific resiliency measure (the Exchange Liquidity Measure, 
XLM) after a shock that adversely affects liquidity on a stock’s home market. We then compare how 
this time path evolves to similar order-book situations on alternative trading venues. The objective is to 
detect whether different types of execution venues are equally resilient in their capacity to restore li-
quidity after such an adverse liquidity shock. In doing that, our work addresses and contributes to the 
academic literature on the impact of market fragmentation and competition between electronic markets 
                                                                 
1 A subset of algorithmic traders, known as high-frequency traders, whose trading strategies are based on very short holding 
periods, accelerates the trading process even more. 
as well as on overall liquidity in order-driven markets. In the field of IS literature, our study contributes 
to the research on the value of IT as it exemplifies how a quicker replenishment of liquidity attributable 
to the growing use of algorithmic trading increases market efficiency. Thereby, the advent of high-
frequency databases facilitates analyzing the role of time in the trading process. The remainder of this 
paper is organized as follows: The next section presents previous literature related to our research ques-
tion, both from the realms of IS- as well as from market microstructure literature. The subsequent sec-
tion describes our dataset and methodology. The fourth section reports our findings while the last sec-
tion concludes. 
2. Related Literature   
As mentioned above, our research contributes both to the field of IS, in particular on the general value 
of IT, and to the field of market microstructure in securities trading. 
In terms of the general value of IT, reviews of current academic literature (e.g. Kohli and Grover, 2008) 
suggest that researchers have disengaged from the question whether IT does create value, as numerous 
studies have found that there is a relationship between IT and some aspect of firm value, be it financial, 
intermediate (e.g., process-related) or affective (e.g., perception-related). Melville et al. (2004) evaluate 
accumulated knowledge of IT business value research – on the one hand, from studies that emphasize 
focal firm dynamics and on the other hand from studies that include factors in the competitive environ-
ment. They propose that the greater the degree of competition in an industry, the greater the extent to 
which firms achieve efficiency gains via IT. With newly arising competition among execution venues in 
Europe and an ongoing arms race of IT, it is a highly relevant issue to look at how market participants 
can exploit efficiency gains by means of IT given the increased competitive pressure. In the sense of 
Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1996), the resiliency of a market may be interpreted as an indicator for the 
unique capability of market participants and their IT to achieve just that across a multitude of frag-
mented execution venues: resiliency as defined in the following measures the amount of time it takes 
until a temporary liquidity shock in the market is corrected; how quickly this correction occurs is likely 
to strongly depend on the IT deployment. 
In terms of market microstructure in securities trading, there are extensive amounts of research in both 
theoretical and empirical literature focusing on market quality in general and on liquidity in specific. As 
stated earlier, liquidity is regarded as the most important criterion for market quality. However, only 
resiliency takes account of the time dimension of liquidity. Resiliency may very generally be defined as 
the rate at which pricing errors caused by temporary order-flow shocks are corrected in the market 
(Dong et al., 2007). Yet, different perceptions of resiliency exist: Garbade (1982) looks at resiliency 
from an order replenishment perspective. Black (1971), Kyle (1985), Holthausen et al. (1987), and Har-
ris (2003) analyze resiliency from the price recovery perspective. Gomber et al. (2004) propose a li-
quidity perspective, where a market is said to be resilient when liquidity quickly reverts to normal levels 
after an adverse shock. This study also takes on the liquidity perspective.  
As resiliency provides a key insight into the nature of the market, there are a number of relevant studies 
which investigate the role and importance of resiliency in the case of electronic limit order-books, with 
the better part of research in this context consisting of empirical studies and only a minor part constitut-
ing theoretical work: Degryse et al. (2005) provide an excellent literature overview which covers both 
theoretical and empirical research in terms of the interaction of resiliency with aggressive orders, tick 
size, firm size and order flow. This literature review may be complemented on the theoretical side by 
the work of Foucault et al. (2005), which is an academic view on limit order-books and liquidity impli-
cations investigating how traders’ impatience affects order-book strategies, bid-ask spreads and market 
resiliency, and by Large (2007), who proposes an intensity model for order arrivals and uses that model 
to study order-book resiliency for a single stock traded on the London Stock Exchange. On the empiri-
cal side, we shall mention Dong et al. (2007), who investigate the main features of resiliency (trading 
activity, tick size, information asymmetry, and volatility) and its effect on stock returns. They are able 
to confirm that these are all significant determinants of resiliency, which in turn is only weakly related 
with two other price and quantity dimensions of liquidity (spread and depth) and thus provides signifi-
cant new information on market quality. 
Lastly, it is equally important to position this research piece within the academic literature on latency, 
algorithmic (AT) and high-frequency trading (HFT). Particularly in recent years, latency2 has grown to 
be of paramount importance for traders pursuing strategies that rely on short-term relative price diffe-
rentials; yet, latency reductions were sought for all along over the last decades. In this regard, Easley et 
al. (2009) study the impact of a 1980 major upgrade to the NYSE’s trading environment which reduced 
the execution latency experienced by traders off the floor relative to traders on the floor of the ex-
change. The authors conclude that leveling the playing field improved liquidity and that the technologi-
cal upgrade which increased competition had an economically significant impact on stock returns. No-
wadays, as more data becomes available on AT/HFT trades and orders, research in this field begins to 
emerge: Riordan and Storkenmaier (2009), for instance, study the effects of latency on liquidity and on 
price discovery in an electronic limit order market. Analyzing an important system upgrade at Deutsche 
Börse in 2007, they are able to confirm that a reduction of system latency leads to a decrease of the 
effective spread and thus contributes to market liquidity. Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) investigate the 
impact of “low-latency traders” (in contrast to HFT) on traditional market quality measures and find 
that their activity improves short-term volatility, spreads, and displayed depth in the limit order-book. 
One of the first studies to analyze whether AT improves market quality is Hendershott et al. (2011), 
who find that AT improves liquidity and enhances the informativeness of quotes. Many other studies3 
have since tried to shed light on the influence of AT and HFT on market quality in general and liquidity 
in specific. 
Our study is distinguished from previous empirical analyses in two ways. Firstly, in terms of methodo-
logical details and available data quality: while Dong et al. (2007), for instance, draw on minute-by-
minute data and Gomber et al. (2004) use one-minute order-book snapshots, data points in our study are 
time-stamped to the millisecond and the granularity of snapshots used is on a second-by-second basis, 
thus accounting for the recent increases in speed on electronic trading venues. Secondly and more im-
portantly, we position ourselves very differently in terms of the research question asked: while most 
(not all) previous studies focus on quote-driven markets in the U.S., none of them have, to the best of 
our knowledge, ever addressed the influence of the newly arising competition between order-driven 
securities markets in Europe on resiliency (i.e. the time dimension of liquidity) as an indicator for mar-
ket quality. 
3. Dataset and Methodology 
In this section our research approach will be presented. To begin with, the basic characteristics of the 
Euronext Paris, Chi-X and Turquoise market models will be examined, followed by the description of 
our dataset, i.e. sample selection procedure and data source. Eventually, we will elaborate on the me-
thodology applied. 
                                                                 
2 There is no commonly agreed definition of latency, neither in academic research nor among practitioners: Riordan and Stor-
kenmaier (2009), for instance, define latency in an electronic order-driven market as the time that elapses between submit-
ting an order and receiving confirmation that the order was executed. Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) define latency as the sum 
of three components: the time it takes for information to reach the trader, the time it takes for the trader’s algorithms to ana-
lyze the information, and the time it takes for the generated action to reach the exchange and get implemented. Exchange 
operators typically define latency much more narrowly, usually as the processing delay from the moment an order enters the 
operator’s IT system until an acknowledgement leaves the operator’s IT system. 
3 E.g., Jarnecic and Snape (2010), Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010), Brogaard (2010), Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010), Menk-
veld (2010). 
3.1 Market model characteristics 
Euronext is a pan-European stock exchange based in Paris with subsidiaries in several European mar-
kets. Euronext Paris (ENP) operates a centralized hybrid market (i.e. quote- and order-driven) using an 
electronic trading system, where securities that are sufficiently liquid or securities with a designated 
liquidity provider are traded continuously following price-time priority4. The stocks we study are con-
stituents of the blue-chip index CAC-40, for which ENP is the primary (“home”). All orders are ano-
nymous in the order-book. Trading of French stocks traditionally concentrated on Euronext; there were 
no regional exchanges in France and even though some blue-chip stocks had been cross-tradable on 
European exchanges for some ten years, equity trading had mainly focused on the home market. Today, 
with multi-market competition across Europe, ENP’s market share in French CAC-40 stocks, for which 
ENP is the home market, has fallen to around 67% on average. 
UK-based Chi-X Europe is one of the new market entrants and has gained a considerable market share 
in European blue-chip stocks, which amounted to around 18% in French CAC-40 equities on average in 
September 2010. Chi-X launched its fully electronic trading system in March 2007 and currently serves 
15 European markets. Its specific characteristics make Chi-X relevant for academic research: it was the 
first trading venue in Europe to adopt a maker-taker fee structure (0.30bps are charged for aggressive 
executions, while passive executions receive a 20bps rebate); it is currently the alternative trading venue 
in Europe with the largest market share; and it is a stand-alone provider of trading services in contrast to 
other venues that are part of a structure integrating trading, clearing and settlement services into a single 
group. Trades on Chi-X are matched in price-time priority by a fully electronic proprietary matching 
engine. All orders are anonymous on the order-book. Stocks are traded in their official local currency, 
i.e. EUR for the CAC-40 stocks used in this analysis. 
Turquoise is another new player in the European equities trading arena. As an authorized investment 
firm regulated by the UK’s FSA, Turquoise provides equities trading covering 18 European markets. 
Originally established by a consortium of European investment banks, Turquoise has been majority-
owned by the London Stock Exchange Group since February 2010. Its market share amounted to 
around 4% in French CAC-40 equities on average in September 2010. Trades on Turquoise are matched 
according to price-transparency-time-priority by a fully electronic matching engine. This means that 
visible limit orders are matched before dark orders. All orders are anonymous on the order-book. Stocks 
are traded in their official local currency, i.e. EUR for the CAC-40 stocks used in this analysis. Appli-
cable tick sizes are those defined by the primary markets at the relevant time. Aggressive orders are 
charged 0.28 bps, while passive orders are rebated between 0.20 and 0.24 bps depending on a member’s 
level of the trading activity (Turquoise 2010). 
As presented above, all three market structures exhibit similar market design characteristics for our 
sample of CAC-40 stocks in a way that these stocks are traded continuously in an electronic order-book 
and trading is organized in an order-driven manner. All three venues feature visible as well as non-
displayed order types whereby the latter imposes a limitation to our dataset that will be addressed in the 
next subsection. 
3.2 Dataset 
3.2.1 Sample selection 
Our sample period ranges from November 1st, 2009 to April 30th, 2010. This period was chosen as it 
represents a relatively stable trading environment without any severe exogenous shocks (e.g. any event 
similar to the Lehman bankruptcy). The sample of instruments in this analysis comprises those 15 
                                                                 
4 Euronext’s Internal Matching Service is an optionally available service that uses a trading algorithm privileging a price-
member-time priority, which allows orders at the best price originating from the same member firm subscribing to this ser-
vice to be matched in the central order book. 
stocks from the French blue-chips index CAC-40 that are also constituents of the Eurostoxx50 index. 
They represent some of Europe’s most liquid and thus most heavily traded stocks. All stocks are trada-
ble on Euronext Paris, Chi-X and Turquoise. We checked whether any of them had dropped out or been 
replaced in the CAC-40 index during the sample period. This was not the case. Likewise, none of the 
stocks implemented or cancelled an ADR program during the sample period. In order to avoid any dis-
torting effects, we additionally ensured that no other new execution venue commenced its trading ac-
tivities in French stocks during the sample period, which was also not the case. 
3.2.2 Data source 
For the purpose of our study, we use data retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) 
database. Those data include the ten highest bid and ten lowest ask limits on each side of the electronic 
order-book. Every change in the order-book generates a new database entry and is time-stamped to the 
millisecond.  
The first and last five minutes of each trading day are removed to avoid biases associated with the in-
ventory management and information processing at those times. Opening, closing and potential intra-
day auctions are identified via Reuters’ qualifying code indicating auctions. We use these qualifiers to 
filter the data to exclude auction periods. For our purposes we use limit order-book snapshots sampled 
either every minute or every second (see later section for specification). 
Although all three execution venues feature non-displayed order types in their market models, publicly 
available order-book data lack this hidden liquidity. We can thus measure the change in displayed li-
quidity following an endogenous shock, but not the change in overall (hidden and displayed) liquidity. 
The change in displayed liquidity could therefore underestimate or overestimate overall liquidity 
changes when e.g. order flow has shifted from displayed to hidden. 
3.3 Methodology 
In order to investigate and to compare the resiliency of the three markets, we analyze both the imme-
diate effect of an endogenous shock that adversely affects liquidity and the time path of liquidity recov-
ery. Two steps are therefore required to perform the analysis: firstly, the determination of the relevant 
events (large trades) and secondly, the measurement of the time path of liquidity. 
3.3.1 Determination of endogenous shocks 
An endogenous shock is represented by a large trade that hits the market; the shock is endogenous5 for 
it originates from within the market. Large trades typically consume liquidity from a central limit order-
book and thus adversely affect the amount of liquidity available. The size of the shock is directly related 
to the trade size (Gomber et al., 2004). However, whether a particular trade order is “large” or “small” 
is a relative notion, depending on the number of traders present in the market ready to fill that order 
(Massimb and Phelps, 1994). 
In order to determine a dataset of endogenous shocks, the easiest way would be to select the 100 largest 
trades per stock and per market during the sample period as the events relevant for the purpose of this 
analysis. However, a cross-market comparison reveals that on average, the 100 largest trades are 3.5 
times larger on Euronext Paris (the stocks’ home market) than on Chi-X and even 5.5 times larger on 
ENP than on Turquoise. So, in order to guarantee the comparability and validity of the results, a modi-
fied approach is chosen: firstly, an upper boundary (UB) of the range of large trades qualifying as en-
dogenous shocks is determined as ),,min( iTQiCHIiENPiAll LTLTLTUB = , where ijLT  represents the largest trade 
per stock i and per market j. From this upper boundary UB downwards, the 100 largest trades per stock 
and per market during the sample period are determined, or more precisely the exact instant in which 
they occur. As the event window which shall be analyzed extends from 15 minutes prior to a large trade 
                                                                 
5 In contrast to exogenous shocks, which originate from outside the market, such as e.g. corporate events, news, etc. 
until 15 minutes after the trade, we exclude trades that occur within the first or last 15 minutes of each 
market’s continuous trading session as well as any transactions that occur within 15 minutes before or 
after any intraday call auction. By making use of the TRTH qualifying codes we ensure that only order-
book trades are selected (and e.g., no reported OTC-trade is included in the dataset). 
Table 1 shows the upper boundary (UB) for all stocks that are part of this study. The first column is the 
Reuters Identifier Code (RIC) for the 15 stocks in our sample. The second column presents the upper 
boundary of the interval ( iAllUB ) per stock. 
RIC iAllUB  RIC (cont’d) iAllUB (cont’d) RIC (cont’d) 
i
AllUB  (cont’d) 
AIRP.PA 368,287 FTE.PA 343,332 SGOB.PA 207,660
AXAF.PA 526,171 OREP.PA 385,110 SOGN.PA 528,985 
CAGR.PA 168,006 SASY.PA 400,822 TOTF.PA 432,175 
CARR.PA 254,147 SCHN.PA 529,932 UNBP.PA 192,680 
DANO.PA 485,633 SGEF.PA 437,682 VIV.PA 238,329 
Table 1. Upper boundary of large trades (in EUR) 
3.3.2 Liquidity measurement 
In order to illustrate possible changes in order-book liquidity we apply three variables, namely (i) the 
quoted bid-ask spread, and (ii) the quoted volume at the top of the book, i.e. the number of shares at the 
top of the book for both sides multiplied by the associated quote and (iii) the Exchange Liquidity Meas-
ure (XLM) as developed by Gomber and Schweickert (2002). We use the third measure to capture the 
depth of the order-book, i.e. the order-book liquidity beyond the best bid and ask. The XLM measures 
the execution costs of a (synthetic) round-trip transaction and incorporates the information from all 
orders within the order-book to calculate the weighted average price at which an order of given size 
(EUR-denominated in our case) could be executed immediately at time t. The measure is given in basis 
points (bps) for a given euro transaction volume. The interpretation of the measure is straightforward: 
the lower it is, the more liquid the market for a certain stock. The weighted average price is denoted by 
PB,t(V) and PS,t(V), respectively, where the index (B, S) indicates the type of the transaction (buyer-
initiated or seller-initiated) and V denotes the order size. Let MQt denote the quote midpoint at time t. 
Execution costs for a buy and a sell order in bps are calculated by 
10,000
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t
MQ(V)
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For the execution costs of a round-trip transaction at time t both measures are added. A similar measure 
has been suggested by Irvine et al. (2000) who considered spreads alone not to be sufficient measures 
for market liquidity. For our analyses, we assume round-trip transactions of V=100 kEUR.  
3.3.3 Intraday event analysis 
In order to analyze the impact block trades have on the liquidity and on the resiliency of the market, we 
employ an intraday event study approach. In our general model, the observation immediately prior to 
the large trade is defined as t0. The impact of the large trade is measured as the difference in liquidity 
(operationalized by either the quoted spread, the quoted volume, or by the XLM) from t0 to t1. We de-
fine a pre-event window ranging from 15 minutes prior to the large trade until t0 [-15:0] and a post-
event window ranging from t0 to 15 minutes after the large trade [0:15]. For the analysis, a complete 
series of XLM(V) observations per large trade is required. In a slightly modified specification (“adapted 
model”), we will additionally have an in-depth look at the two intervals [-1:0] and [0:1], i.e. the one 
minute immediately prior to and after the event, respectively. 
4. Results 
The following Table 2 presents the results of the general model: the size of the liquidity shocks and the 
corresponding t-statistics are shown in the column labeled [0:1]. The unit of measurement is bps for the 
XLM and EUR cents for the quoted spread. Let’s focus on Euronext (ENP) first: here, we can see that 
the values are positive and statistically significant. This is absolutely intuitive as large trades, by defini-
tion, adversely affect liquidity and thus lead to an increasing XLM measure. In the next interval, [1:2], 
the values turn negative which indicates a recovery of liquidity. This is again exactly what we expect to 
see, because in resilient markets, liquidity quickly reverts to its normal level. If we now turn to the col-
umns labeled [0:3] and [0:15], i.e. look at the order-book’s liquidity three minutes (15 minutes respec-
tively) after the event, we would anticipate a lower value than in the [0:1] interval as we expect liquidity 
to recover progressively the farther away from the event. Contrary to that expectation, we can observe 
that there is nearly no change in liquidity between [0:1], [0:3] and [0:15].  This holds true for both ENP 
and Chi-X, only Turquoise (TQ) exhibits a different behavior: here, the recovery rate (defined as the 
proportion of the adverse liquidity effect compensated until minute t) is about 30% after three minutes 
and about 35% after 15 minutes. Apparently, refilling the order-book and thus restoring a sufficient 
depth of the book takes longer in a less heavily traded market which highlights that the Turquoise mar-
ket share is well below the one of Chi-X). 
 
Paris [-15:0] [0:1] [1:2] [2:3] [3:4] [4:5] [0:3] [0:15] [-15:15]
∠×quoted spread -0.57*** 0.43*** -0.13*** 0.02 0.11*** -0.05  0.32*** 0.33*** -0.24***
-8.04 7.32 -2.86 0.47 2.13 -0.96 5.42 5.35 -3.98
∠×XLM (100) -1.486*** 1.040***  -0.176** 0.146** 0.159** -0.113 1.010*** 0.997***  0.496***
-11.66 9.62 -2.43 1.98 2.18 -1.52 8.97 8.65 -5.00
[-15:0] [0:1] [1:2] [2:3] [3:4] [4:5] [0:3] [0:15] [-15:15]
∠×quoted spread -0.36*** 0.23*** 0.05 -0.04  0.04 0.02 0.24*** 0.19*** -0.16***
-6.21 4.18 1.26 -0.90 0.83 0.45 4.34 3.22 -2.84
∠×XLM (100) -2.772 ***  1.922*** -0.009  0.003 0.016 -0.059 1.931*** 1.734***  -1.120***
-15.30 13.89 -0.08 0.03 0.17 -0.63 13.85 11.98 -6.62
[-15:0] [0:1] [1:2] [2:3] [3:4] [4:5] [0:3] [0:15] [-15:15]
∠×quoted spread -0.17 0.52*** -0.12 0.31*** -0.21** 0.07 0.85*** 0.49*** -0.18
-1.55 5.09 -1.16 0.01 -2.06 0.67 5.84 3.83 -1.39
∠×XLM (100)  -6.288*** 5.019*** 2.788**  -1.357 -0.454  0.457 3.483** 3.217*** -1.388
-4.17 3.27 1.96 -0.96 -0.31 0.31 2.32 2.43 -0.75
Euronext
Chi-X
Turquoise
 
Table 2. Event study results (“General model” specification). The upper entry in each cell 
shows the change (delta) in the liquidity measure indicated in the first row over the pe-
riod given in the first line. The lower entry in each cell represents the t-statistic. Aste-
risks represent significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-level, respectively. 
A possible explanation for these first results is that the liquidity shock must have had its peak already 
within the first-minute interval [0:1] and the (remaining) effect we observe at the end of this interval is 
already compensated by the recovery that has taken place between t0 and t1. This seems to confirm what 
Gomber et al. (2004) suspected in a similar study that focused on the resiliency of the Xetra order-book. 
There, the authors discuss the probability of understating the size of a liquidity shock (as measured by 
the difference in XLM from t0 to t1) due to the chosen observation frequency. Having selected a fre-
quency of one minute, they identify the risk of understating the impact of a certain transaction when 
new limit orders are submitted during the delay between t0 and the subsequent observation. The authors 
admit that such an understatement is quite likely given the constant flow of small limit orders6. Hence, 
                                                                 
6 The authors argue that these limit orders are unlikely to be submitted in direct response to the liquidity shock because traders 
need some time to observe the market and to react to the liquidity change. While this argumentation may indeed have been 
valid at the time of the analysis, we would consider this explanation highly unlikely nowadays. In recent years, speed in or-
der execution has become paramount and a plethora of algorithmic trading engines and high-frequency traders are conti-
it seems rational to submit the interval [0:1] to a closer scrutiny. This shall first be done by reference to 
some graphical representations. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the results of the intra-
day event study, exemplified for the market ENP and the XLM (100,000) measure. The horizontal axis 
measures the time, relative to the time of the large transaction t0, in minutes. Liquidity tends to increase 
in the minutes prior to the shock, with a very pronounced rise clearly visible in the minute immediately 
prior to the shock. The large trade, occurring at t0, has an immediate adverse effect on liquidity, yet this 
effect lasts only until briefly after the event. 
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Figure 1. Time path of liquidity (XLM) on ENP with one minute observation frequency over the 
entire event window 
Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the same analysis. The difference here is that the interval [0:1] 
is depicted with an observation frequency of one second (orange), while the remaining data points re-
main depicted in one-minute frequency (blue)7. It is obvious that in fact the adverse effect on liquidity 
is much more pronounced than was visible before – and that at the same time much of it is being ab-
sorbed within the first minute following the event and would “go lost” if analyses were only conducted 
on a one-minute-interval basis. 
7,5
8
8,5
9
9,5
‐0
0:
15
:0
0
‐0
0:
10
:0
0
‐0
0:
05
:0
0
ev
en
t
00
:0
0:
05
00
:0
0:
10
00
:0
0:
15
00
:0
0:
20
00
:0
0:
25
00
:0
0:
30
00
:0
0:
35
00
:0
0:
40
00
:0
0:
45
00
:0
0:
50
00
:0
0:
55
00
:0
1:
00
00
:0
5:
00
00
:1
0:
00
00
:1
5:
00
XLM (pre‐/post‐Event) XLM (during 1st minute)   
Figure 2. Time path of liquidity (XLM) on ENP with one second observation frequency during 
interval [0:1] 
The following Figure 3 shows the same detailed graph of the time path of liquidity on Chi-X, while 
Figure 4 represents TQ. In the case of Chi-X, the average values of the liquidity measure XLM over the 
entire observation period are nearly in the same order of magnitude (~11.51 bps) as on ENP (~8.76 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
nuously monitoring every stock market to literally immediately detect any potential opportunities from temporary imbal-
ances or inefficiencies. It is therefore unlikely today that in an interval of up to nearly one minute, only little changes occur 
in the order book because “traders need time to observe and to decide what to do“. 
7 The horizontal axis again measures the time. The 15-minute interval prior to the event is depicted with an observation fre-
quency of 1 min.; the one-minute interval subsequent to the liquidity shock is depicted with an observation frequency of 1 
sec.; and the 14 minutes following the first post-event minute is again depicted with an observation frequency of 1 min. 
bps), while there is a significant difference in size concerning TQ (~34.88 bps)8. This means that the 
costs a round-trip transaction of 0.1m EUR size in any of the sample stocks entails on average on TQ 
are three times higher than on Chi-X and almost four times higher than on ENP. 
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Figure 3. Time path of liquidity (XLM) on Chi-X with one second observation frequency during 
interval [0:1] 
In terms of comparing the resiliency of these three markets, what is far more interesting than the mere 
magnitude of the liquidity measure is the fact that the liquidity charts themselves differ considerably. 
What we observe on ENP (Figure 2) was to be expected against the background of previous research in 
this area: first, large trades are timed to situations where liquidity is extraordinarily high; second, the 
shock negatively affects liquidity; third, in the aftermath of the shock liquidity recovers to its normal 
level. The important difference in our results is that this recovery occurs far quicker than in earlier stu-
dies. Figure 3 (showing Chi-X) differs distinctly from this “standard” sequence: while again a liquidity 
increase precedes the shock (which confirms timing of trades), the market seems to be capable of ex-
ploiting very precisely the improved liquidity without any overshooting. An explanation for this beha-
vior is not immediately evident; it might to some extent be related to the fact that Chi-X is an institu-
tional investors only market and constitutes another starting point for further research. 
25
30
35
40
45
50
‐0
0:
15
:0
0
‐0
0:
10
:0
0
‐0
0:
05
:0
0
ev
en
t
00
:0
0:
05
00
:0
0:
10
00
:0
0:
15
00
:0
0:
20
00
:0
0:
25
00
:0
0:
30
00
:0
0:
35
00
:0
0:
40
00
:0
0:
45
00
:0
0:
50
00
:0
0:
55
00
:0
1:
00
00
:0
5:
00
00
:1
0:
00
00
:1
5:
00
XLM (pre‐/post‐Event) XLM (during 1st minute)  
Figure 4. Time path of liquidity (XLM) on TQ with one second observation frequency during 
interval [0:1] 
The Turquoise chart, by contrast, depicted in Figure 4 above, exhibits a completely different, seemingly 
erratic, appearance. Here, the adverse liquidity effect does not peak immediately after the shock, but 
rather seems to increase within the first post-event minute. Hitting its highest value at 00:00:49 past the 
shock, the liquidity measure afterwards declines (i.e. recovers) again. There are two possible explana-
tions for this behavior: first, compared with the two other markets in this analysis, TQ exhibits a consi-
derably lower market share, which entails generally less order-flow to replenish the book. Second, the 
lack of an explicit immediate adverse effect could possibly be traced back to the fact that in relation to 
                                                                 
8 These values correspond to relative liquidity costs for a virtual 100,000 EUR round-trip transaction of 87.60 EUR on ENP, 
115.10 EUR on Chi-X and 348.80 EUR on TQ, respectively. The measure hence not only allows for the comparison of se-
curities according to their trading costs, but also for an international comparison of the empirical order book liquidity. 
all trades on that venue, those trades identified as “large in scale” for the purpose of this analysis are not 
sufficiently differentiated from all other trades. This constitutes once more a potential source for a more 
detailed future analysis. 
In light of these insights and returning to statistical analysis, we shall now switch to the “adapted mod-
el”, which means that we will drill into the one minute immediately after the event. The following Table 
3 presents the results of the adapted model. The grayed-out columns (labeled [0:1s] and [0:5s] respec-
tively) show the size of the liquidity shocks and the corresponding t-statistics immediately (one second) 
and five seconds after the event. Compared with column [0:1], which repeats the results from the gener-
al model, we can state that for both ENP and Chi-X the adverse movement is much more pronounced in 
the one-second interval than in the one-minute interval. The recovery rate of liquidity (in terms of the 
XLM) on ENP amounts to 33% within five seconds after the shock and to 35% within sixty seconds 
after the shock. After that (e.g., until three or fifteen minutes past the shock), recovery is negligible. On 
Chi-X, the recovery rate of liquidity is 7% within five seconds after the shock and 12% within sixty 
seconds after the shock. Further recovery until three minutes after the shock is negligible, while after 
fifteen minutes, a total recovery rate of 27% can be observed. In relation to TQ, the results differ: here, 
the adverse liquidity effect does not peak at [0:1s], but rather amidst the first-minute interval (at t=+49 
sec.). Still, like with ENP and Chi-X, liquidity again recovers significantly within the first minute after 
the event. What is also interesting is that XLM and quoted volumes strongly behave inversely propor-
tional (not depicted). While hardly surprising, as much of what runs into the calculation of the XLM 
measure is the top of the order-book, this is yet another sign that transactions are precisely timed by 
market participants to occur when liquidity in the market is extraordinarily high. 
Paris [-15:0] [0:1s] [0:5s] [0:1] [0:3] [0:15]
Δ quoted spread -0.57*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.43***  0.32*** 0.33***
-8.04 6.47 6.69 7.32 5.42 5.35
Δ XLM (100) -1.486*** 1.587*** 1.059*** 1.040*** 1.010*** 0.997***
-11.66 15.62 9.33 9.62 8.97 8.65
[-15:0] [0:1s] [0:5s] [0:1] [0:3] [0:15]
Δ quoted spread -0.36*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.19***
-6.21 5.27 5.66 4.18 4.34 3.22
Δ XLM (100) -2.772 *** 2.180*** 2.031***  1.922*** 1.931*** 1.734***
-15.30 16.69 16.44 13.89 13.85 11.98
[-15:0] [0:1s] [0:5s] [0:1] [0:3] [0:15]
Δ quoted spread -0.17 0.33*** 0.40*** 0.52*** 0.85*** 0.49***
-1.55 4.91 4.21 5.09 5.84 3.83
Δ XLM (100)  -6.288*** 3.734*** 4.023** 5.019*** 3.483** 3.217***
-4.17 4.35 2.79 3.27 2.32 2.43
Euronext
Chi-X
Turquoise
 
Table 3. Event study results (“Adapted model” specification). For legend refer to Table 2. 
5. CONCLUSION / FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this analysis, we investigate how different electronic order-driven markets behave in terms of their 
resiliency after a large endogenous liquidity shock. We can confirm earlier findings that large trades, 
which trigger the liquidity shock, are timed by investors as they occur when liquidity in the market is 
exceptionally high. These large trades have an immediate adverse effect on liquidity, yet this effect lasts 
only until briefly after the event. Most of what happens in consequence of a shock (adverse liquidity 
movement and subsequent recovery) takes place within the first-minute interval after the trade occurred; 
any visible effect already diminishes significantly towards the end of the first post-event minute, whe-
reas this seems to depend on the market a stock is traded on. Three minutes later, basically no effect 
from the liquidity shock remains observable. We attribute this finding to the fact that temporary order-
book imbalances are immediately detected by algorithmic trading engines and high-frequency traders 
who are continuously eagle-eying the stock markets for such opportunities. 
This study may be potential starting points for further research: considering the increasing usage of 
smart order routing technologies at the sell side’s trading desks to identify best-suited execution venues, 
it is likely that when a large trade occurs in one market, another large trade also occurs (at more or less 
the same instant) in another market. A possible extension could therefore be to examine whether this is 
the case and by what factors this timing and slicing of orders is influenced. As this study represents a 
short-term analysis, another interesting perspective could be to analyze the recovery of liquidity over a 
long-term period in order to see how resilient one market is over time and across various market phases 
(heavy trading, different volatility levels, etc.).  
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